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ABSTRACT

CEO’s Pay Differentials and the Location of IPOs: An Empirical Study for Chinese A-share and
H-share Companies

By
LIU Yi
Master of Philosophy

This thesis provides an empirical investigation on how different public listing locations affect
the CEO (chief executive officer)’s pay of Chinese SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) and whether
such a pay differential would in turn affect the listing location choice by those firms, which
have not received much attention in the current literature. In particular, we focus on two stock
markets, the mainland (including Shenzhen and Shanghai) A-share market and Hong Kong Hshare market. Unlike what have been found in many other markets, where firms listed in the
foreign markets can normally enjoy a price premium, Chinese firms listed in the Hong Kong
market (H-share) usually face a discount in prices comparing to what they can get in the
domestic stock markets (A-share). So it is a real puzzle why they are eager to be listed in Hong
Kong. Explanations have been sought in the past regarding to access to international capital
markets and reputation or image effects for the Chinese firms. Our study contributes to the
current oversea-listing literature by examining CEOs’ personal factors that affect listing location
choice of SOEs in China. In this thesis, we aim to examine the association between CEO’s pay
and different listing locations. Our sample covers all the Chinese listed SOEs in both A-share
and H-share over the period of 1990-2009. First, we examined the effect of different listing
locations on CEO’s pay and found that a positive CEO’s pay differential exists for H-share
listing other things being equal, which means a wage premium for H-share CEOs. Furthermore,
our evidences also support the hypothesis that such a wage premium does provide an incentive
for CEOs to choose to list in Hong Kong.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Enterprises not only choose where to sell products and services, but also decide where to
raise funds to finance themselves. Listing location seems to be a big issue for enterprises
to concern about. In recent studies, more attention has been paid to the issue of firm’s
foreign listing, which included the location choice and the effect due to different
locations.
Sarkissian et al. (2010) argue that a valuation premium that non-U.S. firms achieved
through listing on U.S. equity markets is not unique. They observed first the U.S. firms
listed on non-U.S. exchanges and then firms from several other countries experienced
the foreign listing premium. After examining the foreign listing premium across a broad
set of home and host markets, they found that not only the U.S. firms listed abroad get a
value premium but also the non-U.S. firms do and in many other foreign markets, too.
Doidge et al. (2001) focused on firm’s cross-listings. In their study, they found that
cross-listed firms have higher valuation than other firms from their country that do not
cross-list. However, the work did not tackle the potential self-selection issue. They
pointed out that self-selection does not work in their conclusion due possibly to the
limitation of the modeling framework or their belief that selection itself does not affect
the results. They mentioned that further research may help in resolving this issue by
modeling the listing decision as well.
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For emerging market firms, Lins et al. (2005) pointed out that issuing equity on U.S.
stock exchanges could help those firms get a greater access to international capital
markets. They also explicitly considered the location choice for listing. Richter’s study
(2009) investigated the role domestic firm-level political connections plays in
determining a firm’s propensity to cross-list securities in equity markets outside their
traditional home country. He has reached the following conclusion. The weaker the
domestic institutional environment is, the less likely the average firm is to cross-list.
While for connected firms, the weaker the domestic property rights institutions are the
more likely they are to cross-list.
Similarly, there are several papers examining the oversea-listing of Chinese firms as
more and more Chinese firms choose to list overseas in recent years. In a HKIMR
working paper, Liu (2011) tests the effects of public listing on the performance of banks
in China, which contain the different effects of public listing locations in particular.
Tobin et al. (2008) show that international listing can mitigate many of the constraints
on best practice of China’s state banking sector by not only imposing a more consistent
set of rules, but also providing the incentives for convergence.
Specially, previous and recent researches are keen to find out the factors that lie behind
the Chinese firms’ location choice for oversea-listing. They find that cross-listing of
Chinese SOEs (State Owned Enterprises, which are the enterprises controlled by central
government or local governments) is mainly politically motivated as the politically
connected firms are more likely to list oversea. For example, Hung et al. (2010) find that
the connected firms’ managers list their firms overseas for private benefits even though
the connected firms’ post-overseas listing performance is worse than non-connected
6

firms. The investigation covers Chinese SOEs listed in four overseas stock markets,
including Hong Kong, Singapore, the UK and the U.S. Lin et al. (2010) consider
political connection in their study as well. In that paper, they use a broader data set to
investigate the overseas IPO location choice of Chinese firms with the following two
characteristics: (1) the data contain both cross-listed firms and firms just listed abroad;
(2) the sample also includes indirect listings which are lack in Hung’s study.
The objective of our study is to investigate how different public listing locations affect
the CEO’s pay of Chinese SOEs and whether such a pay differential would in turn affect
the listing location choice by those firms. Our study contributes to the literature of
oversea-listing, as recently it has not been paid much attention to that the effect on
CEO’s pay due to different listing locations also the effect of pay differentials on
location choice.
My study extends Lin et al.’s study by adding CEO’s pay differentials as an endogenous
variable to explain IPO location choice. As in Lin et al.’s paper, it mentioned that SOEs
and firms with direct listings are more likely to choose Hong Kong, so we concentrated
on two markets in our study, mainland A-share market and Hong Kong H-share market.
From the two figures 1 and 2 as shown, it is clear that although the number of Chinese
firms listed in H-share market appears to be stable since 1990, the scale of oversealisting is increasing since 2004, which represented a threefold increase in scale than the
previous year. But the climbing trend goes down sharply after 2006, and then rebounds
slowly since 2008. In contrast to A-share market, either listing number or listing scale of
H-share is smaller than that of A-share. It is possible due to the stricter requirement

7

imposed by Hong Kong stock exchanges. However, from Figure 2, we could easily
conclude that the Chinese enterprises are eager to list abroad as the growing market
occupation proved this phenomenon. It is well known that the mainland stock market
holds the much higher P/E ratio than that in Hong Kong stock market. Under such
market situation, that the Chinese enterprises are still eager to list abroad seems to be big
puzzle in the Chinese stock market. Why Chinese firms aspire to list abroad, especially
for SOEs?
In China, there exists a special case. Usually, a CEO of SOEs is a government official or
used to work for government. Especially for a firm controlled by central government,
which we called SOECG (Firth, 2005) in short in the following sections, the CEO is
dominated or appointed by the central government. Mostly, they are strongly connected
with the government. Nevertheless, there is a heavy restriction on government official’s
pay, so if a typical CEO with a stronger connection with the government, his pay
compensation may be more concerned about by the public, which means that the amount
of pay is under a forceful supervision within mainland environment. For another part,
there may exist such a situation, the supervision would become weaker if the CEO
entered into Hong Kong’s environment. Because of the different setting of
compensation, or the different standard level for pay, the CEO could have an excuse to
raise his annual pay with not so much limitation within the Hong Kong system. As a
positive pay differential is supposed, CEOs would desire to self-select into Hong Kong
market if it were available, in order to meet their expectation for higher compensation. A
greater pay differential according to different listing locations would be the motivation
for CEOs to devote for H-share approval.
8

As self-selection is taken as endogeneity, so we use the Heckman selection model to
control for it, which is widely used in the labor economy literature when concerning
about union/non-union workers wage differentials. Still, other variables have been
concerned about when modeling the procedure about forming a decision to choose
where to list, domestic or overseas. Following the previous study in location choice for
listing, we include several variables into our location determining model, such as
political connection, firm’s size, listing offer amount, cost rate and other control
variables.
In summary, we test the effect of different location on CEO’s pay and found that a
positive CEO’s pay differential exists, which means a wage premium of CEO in H-share
SOEs. Then we use the predicted wage premium to find out whether it would in turn
point out a straight direction to the Hong Kong stock market, as what we want to prove.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the initial public listings
(IPOs) of Chinese enterprises. It describes the listing situation in mainland A-share
exchanges and Hong Kong H-share exchanges and reports the cross-listing of Chinese
firms as well. Section 3 review the current literature related to oversea-listings and the
CEO compensation literature. In section 4, we point out the theoretical background of
our model and raise several hypothesis related to our study. Section 5 explains the
research method using Heckman two-step selection as a widely accepted model to
control the endogeneity. Also in this section we present our unique empirical sample.
Consequently, we perform the test on relationship between different listing locations and
pay differentials in section 6. Nevertheless, we analyze the empirical results based on
our theory in this section. Finally, we conclude in section 7.
9

2. REVIEW OF THE PUBLIC LISTINGS OF
CHINESE ENTERPRISES
Following the economic reforms and the privatization over the last 30 years, China’s
economy experiences a strong growth, emerging the stock market and leading to a great
increase in the number of listed enterprises. The dramatic growth of China’s economy in
recent years makes China play an important role in the emerging stock market. Specially,
the rise in IPO events in China can not only be measured by the number of listings, but
also the offering size, the listing methods, no matter direct or indirect, the range of
industries involved and the choices of listing locations.
As Du et al. (2007) show that, in China’s state-dominated financial system, a stock
market listing is a channel to help SOEs raise external financing. Many enterprises,
especially non-state-owned or private firms, face serious restrictions in gaining access to
equity markets. So in this section, we overviewed the phenomenon of IPOs for Chinese
enterprises in both mainland stock market and Hong Kong stock market. As concern to
the direct listing, we observed the A-share market and H-share market. Furthermore, we
divide SOEs into two distinct channels: SOECGs and SOELGs. The SOECGs are firms
controlled by central government and the SOELGs are firms controlled by local
government or a SOECG, according to Firth (2005).
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2.1 IPOS OF CHINESE ENTERPRISES IN MAINLAND
Figure 3 and 4 show the entire pictures of IPO listings in mainland A-share market,
describing the composition of IPO listing number and the composition of total offer
amount since 1990 until now, at the end of June 2011, respectively. Especially, the
SOEs are with breakdowns for different types.
From Figure 3, in general, before 2004, the Chinese SOEs occupy nearly 70% of the
total number of IPOs in mainland A-share market except a bottom of 25% in 1991,
while after that, the occupation of SOEs experience a drop from 50% in 2005 to less
than 2% at the end of June 2011. As the red bars represent the SOELGs proportion, it is
obvious to find that the SOELGs are the majority source of initial listings in A-share
market before 2004, which account for almost 50% of the total number. But there is a
downward trend after 2003, with a drop about nearly 22% during the period of 2004 to
2010. The blue line seems to be flat within the whole period, which represents the
listings of SOECGs. It remains at the region of 10% to 20%, except no listing in 1991.
Figure 4 shows the proportion of SOEs offer amount in mainland market especially for
the directing listings. The SOEs account for nearly 80% of the total amount of offering
during the whole period, only occur a great drop of 50% in 2010. Still, SOECGs hold the
majority proportion of total offering amount in A-share market. However, the SOELGs
experience two highly declines, while the first occur in 2005 accounted for 18% and the
second occur in 2010 accounted for 15%. But the situation of SOECGs is different from
that in the previous figure. Before 2000, SOECGs hold a constant proportion of market
11

offerings represented for about 20%. From 2000 to 2010, the proportion of SOECGs
seems to be fluctuated, climbing to a peak in 2002 (57.9%) then decline to a bottom in
2004 (only 4.8%), while following the first drop it jumps again to achieve the second
peak (64.2%) after two years but falls down again by 27.3% in 2007, and consequently it
reaches a third peak increased by 17.3% in 2008 to get 54.2%. However, it appears
quite low in both 2009 and 2010, representing for only 3%.
Compared with those two figures, we find that the Chinese SOEs still play the most
important role in mainland A-share market. It is more interesting that although the
occupation of SOECGs in number decreased during the period of 2004 to 2009, but its
occupation in amount remains to be the largest part of total offer amount in the same
period.
As shown below in the appendix, Figure 5 and 6 specifically describe the situation of
SOECGs and SOELGs in A-share market respectively. In both figures, the blue bar
stands for the number of IPOs and the red line stands for the offer amount of listing.
Compared to SOELGs, the SOECGs have both less number and offer amount in general.
Specially, even when the financial crisis happened in the late 2008, the SOELGs still
raised their offering in the following year but decrease offering in 2010. Such
phenomena seem to be not obeyed to the market rule or could be explained as that the
mainland stock market has a delay in reaction when facing the financial crises.
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2.2 IPOS OF CHINESE ENTERPRISES IN HONG KONG
Similarly, Figure 7 and 8 show the entire situation of Chinese firms’ direct listing in
Hong Kong H-share market, describing in both the composition of total number and the
composition of total offer amount respectively.
In Figure 7, we find that in four special years SOEs account for the total oversea-listing
number in the whole H-share market, in which are 1994, 1998, 2007 and 2008. Year
1995 appears to be a special year for Hong Kong stock market, as there are no Chinese
firms listed there, either the SOEs or the private companies. Maybe the situation like this
could be explained as in that year, the Chinese central government started the
privatization process of SOEs, which weaken the attraction of Hong Kong stock market
as domestic market seems to be more attractive. While the SOEs also suffer three bottom
point during the whole period of 1994 to 2011, which the lowest occurred in the year
2002 and the following year 2003 representing for 33.37% and the last bottom point
appeared in the year 2009 representing for 66.7%. The proportion of SOECGs in IPO
numbers fluctuated in H-share stock market, also the SOELGs, where the SOECGs have
the peak point of 66.7% twice, jump to reach almost 50% three times and go down to the
bottom (0%) also three times. For the SOELGs, more fluctuated than that of A-share
market but the average level of the proportion is much lower than that of A-share
market, as its mean value is around 44% in Hong Kong stock market compared to 55%
in mainland stock market.
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Figure 8 describes the whole picture about composition of Chinese firms listing amount
in Hong Kong stock market, as it were quite different from that in mainland stock
market. As a whole, in two thirds of the period as shown, the SOEs cover nearly all the
offering amount through IPOs, except in year 1995 as no Chinese firms listed in Hshare. And in the rest period, the SOEs still act as an important part for the oversea
market, with around 64% proportion in 2004 and 2009 while around 32% proportion in
2003 and 2010. Similarly, the SOECGs do practice the same trend as SOEs mentioned
before. But no SOECGs offer H-share in 1998 and 2010 where is different from the
SOEs as the SOELGs choose to list abroad. Furthermore, it is hard to judge for the trend
of SOELGs listing through the proportion of offer amount. Because the movement is
more complicated as it changed frequently. While it has the highest point of 100% and
the lowest point of 0%, but the gap between the consecutive two years changes from the
smallest of 4% to the largest of 50% and fluctuated out of order.
However, the SOECGs and the SOELGs have the same reaction when facing the
financial crises in late 2008. It is shown in both Figure 7 and 8 that the SOECGs and
SOELGs decreased either IPO numbers or IPO offering amount in the Hong Kong stock
market from 2008 to 2009. From 2009 to 2010, the number of SOECGs listing climbed
up while other indices still remained to fall down. However, all the indices of SOECGs
and SOELGs began to go up since 2010. In contrast to A-share market, SOEs listed
oversea are more sensitive to the market environment maybe due to lack of government
controlled.
As shown below in appendix, Figure 9 and 10 specific represent the situation of
SOECGs and SOELGs in H-share market respectively. Apparently, the SOELGs are
14

easy to enter into the Hong Kong stock market to make oversea listing as the number of
IPOs is much larger than that of SOECGs. However, the situation of total offer amount
is not alike the situation of listing numbers. Although the SOECGs have an even smaller
quantity in H-share listing, but they have an extremely greater scale of H-share listing
when bring the SOELGs into comparison. The greatest scale of SOECGs is about 285
billion RMB, which is more than six times of the greatest one of SOELGs accounted for
about 45 billion RMB. What’s more, the average scale of SOECGs is still larger than the
average one of SOELGs, where 33.6 billion RMB for SOECGs while 11.9 billion RMB
for SOELGs.
Looking into the two stock markets, A-share market and H-share market, through all the
figures shown above, we conclude that Chinese SOEs dominate Hong Kong H-share
market. Either the IPO numbers or the scale of IPOs for Chinese SOEs began to decline
since 2009, which indicate that Hong Kong stock market is more attractive for the
Chinese SOEs in the current and future year. An increase of Chinese SOEs listing will
certainly spark the H-share stock market and boom the Hong Kong economy. As a
result, Hong Kong becomes an emerging equity market for Chinese SOEs among other
oversea-listing locations.
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2.3 CROSS LISTING OF CHINESE ENTERPRISES
By the end of June, 2011, 69 Chinese firms have been cross-listing in both mainland and
Hong Kong. In those firms, 59 are SOEs, which represented nearly 86% of total crosslistings in China. Specially, the SOEs included 32 SOECGs and 27 SOELGs, which
show that the majority of cross-listings are SOEs and also signaled that the enterprises
controlled by central government still have a leading position to list aboard.
Besides that, almost 64% of the 69 cross-listed firms choose to list in Hong Kong much
earlier than to list in mainland, which count for 44 as shown on Table 1. And only 7 of
them are private companies, which seems to be interesting that SOEs prefer to choose
Hong Kong stock market not domestic stock market. The total number of SOECGs’ Hshare listing following A-share listing and the cross listing at the same financial year is
similar to their H-share listing before A-share, which represents that the SOECG choose
Hong Kong as its preferred IPO location when they provided cross listings. While the
number of SOELGs cross-listing simultaneously is as twice as the number of their Ashare listings at first. In general, no matter SOEs or non-SOEs, they all desire to list in
Hong Kong stock market as their first choice if it is available. The evidence in total
supports such conclusion as the joint number of first two columns is almost half of the
number in last column, with 25 compared to 44. Actually, Hong Kong still remains as
the most preferred venue for Chinese enterprises’ overseas listing especially for the
SOELGs, where the majority of them occurred to issue H-shares as the first choice.
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1 LITERATURE ON THE DETERMINANTS OF OVERSEALISTING

(1) Access to external capital market
Raising financial funds seems to be the most important reason for firms to list overseas.
In Lins et al.’s paper (2000), they show that access to external capital markets is
important for non-U.S. firms listing in the U.S., and especially so for emerging markets
firms. If a firm is rationed in its access to U.S. exchange market, it may reduce the level
of information asymmetry and achieve a larger investor base. Then investment liquidity
will improve and also the firms could raise funds at a lower cost than firms in domestic
exchange market.
Consequently, we use the total IPO offer amount and cost rate (IPO cost over annual
sales) to test whether such expectation will affect a firm’s listing choice.

(2) Regulatory Bonding
Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999) explained the regulatory bonding theory why
some firms choose to cross-list, one of the most common explanations for why a firm
chooses to cross-listing other than its size. Foreign listing benefits from functionally and
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stricter disclosure requirements could highly protect the investors. Firms can maintain
greater potential benefits by listing in higher quality contracting institutions.
Firm size is one of the variables that we use to predict whether a firm prefer to overseas
listing as we expect that larger firms would be more attractive to investors in foreign
exchanges and have more capability to bear the stricter requirements. In our model, we
provide three variables to identify a firm’s size, including registered capital, annual sales
and employees’ number.

(3) Role of political connection in the overseas listing of Chinese SOEs
Prior literature suggests that political relations and institutional environments affect
privatization outcomes (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Gupta, 2005; Fan et al., 2007), it
provides little evidence on the implication of political connections in the overseas listing
of SOEs. While in Hung et al.’s paper (2010), they investigate the role of political
connections in the overseas listing of Chinese SOEs. They point out that firms have
strong political connections are more likely to list overseas and the managers of
politically connected Chinese SOEs can extract private benefits from listing overseas.
The private benefits are described as the recognition in the political media or a
promotion.
In our empirical test, we use the political connection as a factor to explain the oversealisting choice, but not an instrumental variable to affect a CEO’s benefit on wage.
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3.2 LITERATURE ON CE O COMPENSATION

(1) Definition of CEO compensation
In the paper of Jiang et al. (2010), there are two flow compensation measures, cash pay
and total pay. Cash pay is the sum of salary and bonus, whereas total pay is the sum of
cash pay, stock option grants, restricted stock grants, long-term incentive plan payouts,
and other annual compensation. In our data sample, the CEOs of Chinese firms rarely
has equity incentives in compensation, so we define the wage of CEOs in Chinese firms
as the sum of total pay excluding the equity grants in our study.

(2) CEOs pay determination
As what Conyon (1997) mentioned, the most consistent and enduring result from myriad
studies of CEO pay is that firm size is positively and significantly associated with
compensation levels.
While agency theory argues that one way to align the interests of managers to the
interests of shareholders is to make manager’s compensation a function of firm
performance (Kaplan, 1994; Murphy, 1985, 1999). In Firth’s model (2005), they used
two measures, one is accounting-based and one is the stock return. Their accounting
measure of performance is return on sales (ROS) and the other performance measure is
the annual stock return (RET).
19

In our model, we also use firm size and firm performance to justify the CEOs
compensation. We use both the number of a firm’s employees and its annual sales to
proxy for a firm’s size. And still we use both accounting-based measure and stock return
to calculate a firm’s performance. Our accounting measure of performance includes
ROA, ROE and profit ratio. The ROA (return on assets) and ROE (the return on equity)
are not used in Firth’s model as it mentioned by Chen et al. (1998) that those measures
of profitability suffers from the fact that the values placed on assets are subject to
management discretion. However, we only focus on SOEs, so we think the ROA and
ROE could measure the firm’s performance better as still. And the profit ratio is defined
as net profit over annual sales while EPS (earning per share) is used as measure of stock
return.
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4. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND
HYPOTHESIS
This section discusses the theoretical background with the Heckman Selection model
and proposes some hypothesis regarding the oversea-listing choice for our empirical
analysis. In our research, we aim to investigate how different public listing locations
affect the CEO’s pay of Chinese SOEs and whether such a pay differential would in turn
affect the listing location choice by those firms. So our model has been separated into
two parts. First, we build a CEO pay model which involves a location dummy to
determine the pay setting and predict a typical CEO’s pay due to different stock markets.
Deriving from those predicted pays in A-share market and H-share market, we get a pay
differential for each observation. Accordingly, we would like to examine the listing
location decision based on pay differentials and other characteristics as our second part.

4.1 SELF-SELECTION MODEL FOR CEO PAY DIFFERENTIALS
Consider a CEO’s pay, using a dummy variable to simply pick up the H-share effect in a
pooled sample of H-share and A-share CEOs is inappropriate since CEOs in H-share
may self-select and CEOs being in H-share may not be random. Pay differentials due to
different market status would obtain when self-selection is taken into account. If a CEO
expected that the standard pay in H-share market is greater than that in A-share market,
he may choose to list in H-share market because of the pay differential and push the
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enterprise to achieve H-listing approval. Thus the endogeneity arises as the market status
is a selection bias in the estimation of CEO’s pay.
In the literature of labor economy, a conventional Heckman two-step selection model is
used to obtained union/non-union wage differentials by controlling the potential
endogeneity of union status. In our empirical studies, the situation about H-share/non-Hshare (A-share) CEO pay differential is quite similar to the situation about union/nonunion wage differential, so we use the Heckman two-step selection model to predict the
CEOs pay differentials result in self-selection for H-share status.
In our model, we use the separately estimated A-share and H-share pay equations for
CEOs as we supposed that a typical market status is endogenous and CEOs self-select
into H-share/A-share markets. Taking H-share status as an endogenous variable refers to
the fact that it is potentially a choice variable, the decision to list in H-share or not list in
H-share is correlated with unobservable that affect CEO’s wage. Supposed that within
the Hong Kong market CEOs may expect to raise their pay in order to meet the market
standard level, we use the separately estimated wage equations due to the different
markets.
Following the approach, a percentage union-nonunion wage differential with a worker’s
reservation wage is presumed to determine his union status. If the union wage
differential exceeds the reservation wage, the worker chooses for a union job, if
opposite, the worker selects a nonunion job.
Now, we supposed that if the predicted H-share/non-H-share wage differential is
positive, CEO selects to list in H-share, otherwise he does not.
22

Let Hi be an H-share status variable, if Hi=1, CEO selects to list in H-share market,
otherwise he does not. For the ith individual, the H-share/non-H-share status equation is
defined as:
(1) Hi=α0+α1Xi+α2Yi+α3 (LnWhi – LnWai) + α4 Zi+ εi
Where Xi is a vector of personal characteristics; Yi is also a vector of each firm’s
characteristics; Whi and Wai are H-share and A-share CEO’s pay, respectively; Zi is a
vector of other explanatory variables to determine the H-share status, and εi is a random
disturbance term. The term (LnWhi – LnWai) is defined as approximate percentage
CEO’s pay differential.
The personal characteristics included in Xi in the equation above are CEO’s political
connection, CEO’s education level and CEO’s age. The firm’s characteristics included
in Yi are firm’s nature belongings, firm’s performance measures, firm’s profitability,
firm’s size and firm’s industry catalogue defined by GICS in Hong Kong as the same in
mainland.
The selection model also included the two equations representing the pay determination
for H-share and A-share CEOs:
(2) LnWhi = βh0+βh1Xhi+βh2Yhi+εhi
(3) LnWai = βa0+βa1Xai+βa2Yai+εai
Equation (2) is the pay equation determined for H-share CEOs while (3) is the pay
equation determined for A-share CEOs, where Xhi and Xai are vectors of personal
characteristics for H-share and non-H-share (A-share) CEOs, respectively; Yhi and Yai
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are vectors of each firm’s characteristics for H-share and non-H-share (A-share) firms,
respectively; and εhi and εai are random disturbance terms.
Observed personal characteristics included in Xhi and Xai are CEO’s education level,
CEO’s professional background and CEO’s age. The observed firm’s characteristics
included in Yhi and Yai are firm’s nature belongings (SOECG or SOELG), firm’s size
(annual employees number and sales), firm’s performance measures (ROA, ROE, EPS),
firm’s profitability (profit ratio which defined as net profit over sales) and firm’s
industry belongings (separated into 5 industries).
Using Heckman two-step selection model, where in the first step a probit model is used
to predict the probability of H-share status and in the second step, the inverse Mill’s
ratio (IMR) is included as a regresseor.

4.2 HYPOTHESES FOR LISTING LOCATION
Next, we examine the firm’s listing location choices. In this subsection, we will present
the main hypotheses regarding the advantages and disadvantages of H-share status for
Chinese SOEs.

(1) CEOs pay differentials advantage of H-share market
CEOs pay differentials derived from the Heckman selection model would make a
positive effect on firm’s H-share listing choice. CEOs under different market conditions
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may expect to be compensated by different setting levels. Suppose that we could obtain
a positive pay differential derived from the selection, which means that a pay premium
of CEOs in H-share SOEs. Such pay premiums will certainly affect listing location
choice, which incentives CEOs to self-select in H-share market. As a result, expecting
the pay premium, CEOs are more eager to achieve approval of H-share listing in order to
meet their self-satisfactions. CEOs pay differentials seem to be a strong motivation for
firms to list aboard other than domestic stock market.

(2) Advantage of CEO’s political connection
As mentioned before, political connection means that the chairman or CEO of the firm is
a government official, or a member of National People’s Congress or People’s Political
Consultative Conference, following the definition of Hung et al. (2010). When a CEO is
politically connected, it is highly likely that the firm would be much easier to get access
to the oversea-listing. Also, with a politically connected CEO, the firm is supposed to be
much easier to get through the barrier of listing aboard compared to the firm without
such a CEO.

(3) Advantage of SOECGs
SOEs controlled by central government also have political advantage. Following Lin et
al. (2010), oversea-listings of the SOEs need to be approved by CSRC and the central
government in fact plays an important role in deciding where the firms will be listed.
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The central government may have its own political objectives and use listings to support
Hong Kong’s economy. In general, the central government has stronger political
influences on SOEs compared with the local government. In our study, we enlarge the
hypothesis that SOECGs usually are supersize enterprises which need much more
funding raised and also own the strong power to attract foreign investors. In
consequence, it is much more attraction for SOEs controlled by central government to
seek oversea-listings.

(4) Cost rate disadvantage of H-share market as compared to A-share market
The listing costs have recently attracted public attention in Hong Kong, and
commentators have asked whether the costs of listing in Hong Kong are too high,
reported by Research & Policy. The typical explicit costs of a Hong Kong IPO include
underwriting commission, professional services fees, share certificates and fees of the
registrar and receiving banks in the IPO, publicity costs and exchange fees. We defined
the cost rate are determined as percentage of cost over annual sales. Within the stricter
cost rate, it would make a negative effect on firm’s H-share listings.

(5) Other hypotheses
Also there are other control variables that would influence the SOE’s location choice,
such as the firm’s profitability, the firm’s size and the firm’s financing needs. Stronger
profitability would certainly support the firms to decide listing aboard as to attract
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foreign investors. Higher profit ratio may provide the firms much confidence to ensure
shareholders benefit even facing higher market risk as listing oversea. Also the firm’s
size is a factor to affect its location choice. The large scale of size may guarantee firm’s
stability in a typical market. In another words, the larger the size, the more stable it is,
which means that it has the ability to face the more challenge appeared in H-share
market. Furthermore, H-share market could provide the opportunity for firms to meet
their financing needs and also give them a chance to access to foreign capital market,
while the A-share market is in shortage. The desire for huge raising funs would incentive
the firms to list aboard, whereas the amount raised in domestic stock market is much
smaller.
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5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Following the theoretical model as discussed earlier, we would like to show whether
there exists any empirical evidence to support our initial hypothesis. In particular, we try
to predict each CEO’s pay in different markets, both H-share market and A-share
market, to see if the pays are different for “H-share listing company” and “A-share
listing company”. Furthermore, it is extremely important that if such pay differentials
exist it must also influence listing location choice for Chinese SOEs in order to meet
CEOs self-satisfaction.

5.1 THE DATA
Until 1998, Chinese listed companies in mainland stock markets were not required to
disclose executive compensations, which include the remuneration to the board
directors, supervisors and the senior management in the annual report. We use the exact
pay for a typical CEO in A-share listing enterprise. The annual reported pay for
companies listed in A-share market is the total cash compensation but not separated into
detailed components, while the annual reported pay for companies listed in H-share
market is broken down into several components, including cash pay and equity
incentives, whereas the cash pay is the sum of fee, salary, discretionary bonuses,
allowances, benefits in kind, pension scheme contribution and the equity incentives are
the total amount of restricted stock grants and stock appreciation rights. When we
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check the cross-listing enterprises whether they have different CEOs in different market,
we find that such enterprises have the same CEO and the same pay in both markets.
Meanwhile, we also find that the pay of A-share report is the value of cash pay except
the equity incentives according to detailed pay components in H-share report. For
Chinese listed companies, equity compensation is not commonly used and fewer
companies use the equity incentives for CEO’s compensation in either A-share market
or H-share market. If they exist, we could only get the real value from H-share annual
report, but in the A-share annual report, it is not available to value the stock grants and
option grants from it. To judge the pay equally, we eliminate the equity pay from total
pay in H-share report as an annul pay for CEOs titled in “H-share market”. For CEOs
titled in “A-share market”, we use the total pay directly in A-share report as an annual
pay. Unfortunately the compensation disclosures in Hong Kong stock market have only
been required since 2005. The earliest data of CEOs pay we could get in H-share market
is in 2004 as the listed companies are also required to report the executive compensation
of last accounting year in the annual report.
Specifically, the IPO total offer amount for a typical SOE we discussed is the amount of
direct listing on the stock market. Those companies listed through indirect channel, such
as back door listing and enterprise's mergers and acquisitions, would not be included in
our sample. Also, the data for listing cost is unavailable before 1993 in A-share market
and before 1999 in H-share market. Due to the data constraint, we omitted some
observations in both markets.
In total, our sample includes 626 listed SOEs in both A-share market and H-share
market, whereas the number of A-share companies is 593 while the number of H-share
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companies is 33. The sample data consists of 2211 A-share CEO observations from1998
to 2009, which covered 85 SOECGs and 507 SOELGs, and 124 H-share CEO
observations from 2004 to 2009, which covered 11 SOECGs and 23 SOELGs. We
treated as an unbalance pooled sample.
We use the Wind Database as our main data source of information for A-share firms’
characteristics and performance measures, CEOs characteristics and compensation, and
the information of H-share firms’ characteristics and performance measures. H-share
CEOs characteristics and compensation are obtained from the annual reports which are
collected form the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) website. Furthermore, all the
SOEs in both markets have been divided into two groups, SOECG and SOELG. We
search the website of State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
of the State Council to signal the “SOECG” enterprises.

5.2 SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Figure 11-15 describe the CEOs average pay for firms’ IPO occurred in an assigned
year. Due to the data constraint, we observe five special years, as the firms listed in
those years have the data of CEO’s pay pre-IPO and after-IPO. We defined IPO age as
the number is equal to the report year minus listing year. So we know that if IPO age is
smaller than zero, which means that the wage represented for the period before IPOs; if
IPO age is equal to zero, where the wage represented for the listing year’s pay; if IPO
age is larger than zero, then the wage is the mean level of CEO’s pay after IPOs. What

30

else, the full line show the pay level of A-share companies while the line of dashes show
the pay level of H-share companies.
It is obvious to find that a booming on pay when IPO happened no matter the A-share
companies or the H-share companies. What’s more, it is indicated that CEOs of H-share
companies experienced an average higher pay level compared to that of A-share
companies, except in 2007. Such phenomena in deep make us convince our hypothesis,
pay differentials should occur due to the different listing locations.
Table 2 shows the entire picture of CEOs average pay in three groups, CEO’s general
pay, CEO’s pay based on ownership structure and CEO’s pay based on industry
catalogue. All the groups are separated into A-share market and H-share market. Still,
CEOs in H-share market gain a higher pay in average through all the three groups,
which proved our initial hypothesis about pay differentials in statistics analysis.

5.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
5.3.1 HECKMAN SELECTIVI TY MODEL

In our empirical study, we want to investigate the pay differential between H-share
CEOs and A-share CEOs. For the purpose of this, we need to separate the CEOs into
two groups using the location dummy to distinguish “H-share” vs. “A-share” CEOs and
finally test our theory.
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In the Heckman selection mode, our main dependent variable is the natural logarithm
value of yearly pay for CEOs (described as Lnwage below). We converted all the pays
in accounting year into RMB. The independent variables included as follows:
(1) SOECG, a dummy variable coded 1 if the SOE is controlled by the central
government, while if the SOE is controlled by the local government or SOECG, it coded
0;
(2) Lnsale and Lnsize, which are defined as the natural logarithm value of annual sales
and annual number of employees respectively, indicate the firm’s scale and size;
(3) Firm’s performance measures, our accounting measure of performance is return on
owners’ equity (ROE) and the measure of stock return is the earning per share (EPS).
This is following Firth et al. (2005), as he mentioned that in developed nations,
accounting profit and stock returns are two of the major indicators of a company’s
financial performance. To use these performance measures in China pre-suppose the
profit number and stock returns have credibility. And the profit and stock returns do
reflect economic performance. While in our model, we broadened the measures by
adding the variables of ROA (return on asset).
(4) Firm’s profitability, ratio index, defined as profit ratio, which is equal to net profit
divided by annual sales. The same variable followed as used in Lin et al.’s research
(2010).
(5) Potential working experiences, as most of the CEOs completed their postgraduate
study during the working period, which is treated as a Part-time degree. It is hard to
judge their working years if we use the method of age minus the year of finishing the
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highest grade of education and again minus six, so we straightly use the age (accounting
year-birth year) and its square term to measure the CEO’s potential working experiences
in an indirect way;
(6) Education level, we use dummy variable to estimate the highest degree the CEO
obtained, where degree coded 1 if the CEO obtained a bachelor degree or a postgraduate
degree, if the CEO’s qualified is sub-degree, then degree coded 0;
(7) Control variables such as year dummy and industry dummies. Year dummy is equal
to the exact number of accounting year, while industry controls contain four dummies,
where Ind1 represents the Information Technology and Energy Industry, Ind2 represents
the Utilities and Health Care Industry, In3 represents the Raw Materials and Industrial
Industry, Ind4 represents the Financial Industry and the benchmark choice (omitted) is
Daily and Non-Daily Consumption Industry.
Specially, we want to examine whether difference in pay-offs for CEOs result in selfselection for H-share status. In consequence, we need some variables explained for the
choice of listing location but not affect pay directly. We believe that CEO’s political
connection, firm’s profitability and the scale of firm’s raising funds through IPO could
be explanatory factors to the choice of market status but not necessarily affect the pay
setting. It is supposed that the CEO’s political connection will provide positive political
power on getting through the barrier of H-share listings. The last two variables will
capture the firm’s ability and desire to list aboard. Such three variables further satisfy the
identification conditions of our selection model where taken “H-share” status as the
selective bias.
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As mentioned before, our empirical study aims to estimate the impact of “H-share”
status on CEOs pay differentials between H-share SOEs and A-share SOEs. Firstly, we
need to run the basic pay equation as follow:
(4) LnWagei = λ1Xi + εi
Where the indice i stands for individual. εi is a normally distribution error term with zero
mean. Xi is a vector of independent variables including all the variables described above
plus a constant and a location dummy variable. Also we estimate the wage equation
using the robust estimator to signal each individual by a typical “stock code” in the
unbalance pooled data.
Next, if the differences of CEO’s pay for different location status are observable to
individuals, it is believed that a typical CEO will react to such differences and self-select
into an “H-share” status if it is available. As a result, observed pay differentials may be
censored by such a selection. So we need to run Heckman selection model to correct
such a bias and examine that whether there is a self-selection process for CEOs to obtain
a wage premium.
The selectivity model for “H-share” vs. “A-share” status is similar as presented before in
part 4.1:
LnWagehi = λh1Xi + εhi
LnWageai = λa1Xi + εai
Hi= α (LnWagehi – LnWageai) +ΖiΦ+ ηi

(5)

34

where the subscript h and a stand for “H-share” status and “A-share” status respectively.
Hi is the location dummy for “H-share” status. Wagehi is observed when Hi=1, while
Wageai is observed when Hi=0. And εhi ~ N (0, σhi), εai ~ N (0, σai), ηi ~ N (0, 1).
Ζi contains the four explanatory variables determined the choice of market status and all
independent variables in Xi , described in equation (4), except for the location dummy
defined as “H-share” status. This self-selection model can be estimated simultaneously
by the full information maximum-likelihood method. A test for selectivity bias “Hshare” status is a test for ρ=0, if ρ<0, it means that the self-selection mechanism exists
and those CEOs who self-select in H-share status obtain a wage premium.

5.3.2 PROBIT MODEL FOR LOCATION CHOICE
We would like to test which market status is a SOE’s preferred choice, taking Hong
Kong H-share market and mainland A-share market for concern.
We estimate the following probit regression model. Assuming the determined
component Hhi and random components εhi are separable, the probability of the
individual i choosing location h can be expressed as:
Pi = P (Hhi+εhi > Hai+ εai)

(6)

where h and a represent for the location choices of H-share market and A-share market.
We express the index Hhi as:
Hi = ρ0 DWi + ρ1 Ζi+ εi

(7)
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Where Hi is the location dummy for “H-share” status; DWi is derived from Heckman
selectivity model, defined as DWi = LnŴagehi – LnŴageai; Ζi contains explanatory
variables in the selection model plus a constant. Still we use the robust estimator to
signal each individual by a typical “stock code” in the unbalance pooled data.
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
6.1 LINEAR WAGE EQUATIONS
Following the estimation approaches presented in section 5, first we run linear equations
to estimate CEOs’ pay setting. The results are shown in Table 3, in which we presented
four wage estimation results. They are derived from a basic wage equation based on
labor economics literature. The important variation in our model is to include an IPO
location dummy-hdummy, which is equal to one for “H-share” in all wage equations.
In column (1) of Table 3, following the labor economy literature, we build a basic wage
equation by using the traditional wage determinants, such as age, education level and
control variables (industry dummy and year dummy). Except those human capital
variables, a location dummy is involved. In column (1), Hdummy and Degree variables
are statistically significant at 1% and 10% level respectively while the Age variable is
insignificant, which indicates that location does affect wage setting in rough as the
model is too simple.
It is widely known that a CEO’s pay could not be only explained by his personal
characteristics but also affected by a firm’s performance, as the CEO’s pay is linked to
the firm’s normal operation. So in column (2), we add some performance measures to
valuate the effect on wage in firm’s level. Still Hdummy is significant at 1% level even
despite adding some accounting measure variables. But for the new variables, ROE and
EPS seem to be significant and make a positive effect while ROA and Profit (Profit ratio
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in short) are insignificant. Again the Age variable, examining the working experience
indirectly, is insignificant as well as the Degree.
With more extension in column (3), more characteristics of a firm have been concerned
about, such as a firm’s belongs and its size (including the number of employees and
sales by year). Looking into column (3), we find that Hdummy, Lnsale and EPS are
highly significant at 1% level in affecting the CEO’s pay positively. While firms’ scale
of employees and control by central government make a significant negative effect on
pay setting. Still other explanatory variables do not work in determining wage except
ROE.
Finally, in the last column- we insert four new variables into our linear wage equation
for CEOs, which contained a dummy variable to indicate a CEO’s political status
(Political in short), a firm’s registered capital and some indicators to evaluate the IPO
event (including total offer amount and cost ratio). Variables such as Lnrp, Lnoffer and
Csale are statistically insignificant in the wage equation, where Lnrp represents the
natural logarithm value of a firm’s registered capital, Lnoffer represents the natural
logarithm value of a firm’s offering shares times its offer price per share through IPO
and Csale represents the cost ratio that equaled to the actual IPO cost over annual sales.
Those insignificant variables can then be used as instrumental variables to explain for
location choice in Heckman two-step selectivity model. However, the variables that are
significant in column (3) still remain the same effect on wage in column (4)
significantly. Especially, the new variable, Political, gives a positive influence on pay
setting.
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In general, the location dummy variable is shown to be statistically significant at 1%
level in all four columns, from which we could conclude that the effect of location
choice on CEOs compensation does exist. Also the positive coefficient of Hdummy
demonstrates that for a typical CEO, when other factors are controlled, entering into an
H-share market could earn a higher wage, dominating a wage premium of “H-share”
status. Such expected wage premium would be the motivation for CEOs to self-select
into oversea market and therefore would induce endogeneity. If endogeneity exists,
simple linear regression would be not appropriate to explain for the CEOs’ pay setting,
as the location effect should be taken as the selective bias.
Moreover, the pay of a CEO in SOEs is not market driven in China as some indicators of
performance measurement do not work. It makes more sense to run wage equations
separately for A-share and H-share CEOs to match the different market situations. So we
should better use the Heckman two-stage model to modify the wage determined
equation.

6.2 HECKMAN TWO-STAGE SELECTION MODE L
Next, we turn to our Heckman two-stage selection model. In the model, first stage is to
describe the determinants of the selected bias while in the second stage the selected
observations form the wage equation under an appointed condition. Specifically, the
Hdummy is the selective bias in our model.
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From the conclusion made above, we keep all the explanatory variables in column (3)
except Hdummy in the second stage to calculate the wage equation. For the selection
stage, concerning Hdummy as the dependent variable, we use Political, Lnrp, Lnoffer
and Csale as the instrumental variables for location choice. Although the variable
Political appears to be significant in linear wage regression, when we put it into the
second stage as a determinant for wage in the selection, it does not work. It is perhaps
because of its little impact on wage. However, when we consider a location for listing,
political connection seems to be mostly important as we discussed in the hypothesis part.
Other variables like registered capital of the firm, the firm’s offering amount and
experienced cost in the IPO day are also necessary to determine the location, as they are
all insignificant in the linear wage regression. So we pick up those four variables as the
instrumental variables.
Table 4 and 5 describe the wage determination under H-share market and A-share
market respectively.
For H-share status, a CEO’s pay is positively related to a firm’s annual sales and
profitability, that a firm’s performance could affect a CEO’s compensation level in
certain. Also higher education level gives an advantage to gain higher pay as the
benchmark choice (omitted) of education level is bachelor and above. The coefficients
of SOECG and EPS are both negative which is fit for the Chinese situation that a CEO
belongs to a central government controlled firms usually has to obey the restriction on
pay compensation as we mentioned before. Now we turn to the first stage of the
selection model, which shows the procedure of self-selection into a special market, and
we find that political connection is more related to a firm’s location choice. If a typical
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CEO were political connected, the firm would prefer listing on H-share market. Maybe it
is attributed to the possibility that with political connection a firm could obtain the
approval of H-share listing easier. Meanwhile compared to SOELGs, SOECG are more
likely to list in H-share market. And the total IPO offer amount and ROE both make
positive effect on choosing Hong Kong market, but a firm’s registered capital and ROA
both make negative effect on the “H-share” status. Nevertheless the cost rate and a
firm’s size (both the number of employees and the annual sales) do not affect the
decision of location determined. Most importantly, the value of Lnsigma is significantly
negative. This show that CEOs do self-select themselves to “H-share” status and
selectivity does exist. This further proves our hypothesis of endogeneity.
For A-share status, the situation is different. In wage equation, annual sales, ROE and
EPS all positively affect a CEO’s pay while the number of employees negatively affects
on pay. There seems to be no influence from SOECG, maybe because that now all the
SOEs in sample are under the mainland market environment, so the CEOs of SOEs are
all restricted on pay, no matter whether they belong to a SOECG or belong to a SOELG.
Then as we turn to location determined equation, it is found that the coefficient sign of
variables, which are significant in “H-share” status, are all opposite to the sign in “Hshare” location determined equation and still significant in “A-share” status. In addition,
the value of Lnsigma in A-share market is significant negative again, proving that
selectivity exists.
Deriving from the Heckman selection model in different markets, we get the predicted
wage for each CEO, naming LnH and LnA, which represented a typical CEO’s wage in
H-share market and the wage in A-share market respectively. Next we build a pay
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differential for each CEO, which is defined as the differentials between the H-share
predicted wage and the A-share predicted wage. We denote it D, which is equal to LnH
minus LnA.
In summary, we show the value of Lnwage, LnH, LnA and D in Table 6. It is clear to
say that pay differentials really exist due to different market conditions. D is equal to
1.042 on average, which shows that for a typical CEO, his wage in H-share market is
nearly 10 times greater than his wage in A-share market equally.

6.3 LOCATION DETERMINED MODEL
Finally, in table 7, we show the Probit test of location choice. As it is shown, the wage
differentials, political connection, total IPO offer amount and SOECG, ROE and
profitability are all positively related to a firm’s choice on H-share market, but ROE is
negatively related to the H-share decision. Besides, all the control variables seem to be
statistically significant and pointing to a direction to list aboard. However, the firm’s
registered capital does not work on location choice, as well as if a firm belongs to the
financial industry.
In other words, the firms controlled by central government are much more eager to list
aboard and the wage differentials do matter the location choice. All the effects are
proven as what we expected before.
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7. CONCLUSION
In the recent research on firm’s choice of listing location, attentions are mainly paid at
potential considerations at firm or country level, which draw the conclusion that the
purpose of overseas listing is mainly related to raising funds through external financing
or the desire of promoting firm’s reputation in the global market. Such factors not be
sufficient to explain the puzzle why many Chinese SOEs would like to choose Hong
Kong as their IPO location even though the average P/E ratios of H-share firms is often
significantly lower than that of A-share firms. There is hardly any literature considering
about the potential influence of CEOs’ compensation level on location choice. This
thesis provides an empirical investigation on whether and how a CEO’s pay would affect
where a firm is listed using SOE firms from the Chinese mainland as our sample. By so
doing, we not only can better explain the puzzle mentioned above but also provides a
different angle to consider firms’ IPO location choice.
Our empirical analyses aim to test two main hypotheses. First, we suggest that CEO pay,
especially for SOE, may vary across different stock markets. More specifically, other
things being equal, there may be a wage gap between CEOs of H-share vs. A-share
firms. In other words, a wage premium may occur in H-share market. Second, in
response to pay differentials across different markets, CEOs are more likely to selfselect themselves into H-share market by listing their firms in there. This shows that a
pay differential would lead to a preference to list in Hong Kong.
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Indeed, the empirical results provide support to our claims. The wage premium actually
existed in favor of H-share firms and as a result CEOs for SOE do tend to self-select
themselves into H-share market. Such a finding is very plausible in the Chinese context
in particular. CEOs of state-owned enterprises in China are often appointed by the
government and are treated as government officials, especially for large SOEs. Hence,
their pays are often benchmarked against certain level of government officials in China
and hence may be significantly lower than the pay for similar CEOs in the private sector.
By listing their firms abroad such as the Hong Kong stock market, this gives the CEOs
an excuse to raise their pay more closely to the market level as Hong Kong follows free
market rules and local board members and other staff hired by these SOEs listed in Hong
Kong have to be paid at market rate. Our finding of CEO pay differentials in favor of Hshare CEOs really confirms such a conjecture. The more interesting finding then is
whether such a pay differential influences CEOs’ listing decisions in a way that is driven
by the private motives of these CEOs. Indeed, the finding here confirms it would induce
CEOs’ of state-owned enterprises to seek for listing in Hong Kong. Such a finding
provides an additional and forceful explanation to the puzzle that many SOEs in China
would like to choose to list in Hong Kong despite the factor their shares usually
command lower prices here.
Our study still has the limitation as we only observe the Hong Kong stock market as the
listing aboard location. In future, we could broaden the sample size by including other
foreign stock markets, such as U.S., London and Singapore.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1.The Yearly Quantity of IPOs in A-share Market and Hshare Market (1990-2011)
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Figure 2.The Yearly Scale of IPOs in A-share Market and H-share
Market (1990-2011)

Figure2. IPOs Scale in A-share & H-share
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Figure 3.The Yearly Quantity of SOE’s IPOs in Percentage in Ashare Market (1990-2011)
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Figure 4.The Yearly Scale of SOE’s IPOs in Percentage in A-share
Market (1990-2011)

Figure 4. The proportion of SOEs Offer Amount* in
A-share Market (1990-2011)
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Figure 5.The Yearly Quantity and Scale of SOECG’s IPOs in A-share
Market (1990-2011)

Figure 5. Offer Amount* and Number of SOECG
IPOs in A-share Market (1990-2011)
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Figure 6.The Yearly Quantity and Scale of SOELG’s IPOs in A-share
Market (1990-2011)

Figure 6. Offer Amount* and Number of SOELGs in
A-share Market (1990-2011)
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Figure 7.The Yearly Quantity of SOE’s IPOs in Percentage in Hshare Market (1994-2011)
Figure 7. The Proportion of SOEs Listing Number in H-share
Market (1994-2011)
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Figure 8.The Yearly Scale of SOE’s IPOs in Percentage in H-share
Market (1994-2011)

120.0

Figure 8. The Proportion of SOEs Offer Amount* in
H-share Market (1994-2011)
100.0

100.0100.0100.099.5

100.0

89.1

98.2 97.1100.0100.0
89.8

100.0

100.0

86.5

80.0
66.6

61.6
60.0

40.0

51.4

50.2

0.0

0.0
0.0

33.6 32.1

31.1 30.8

27.8

20.0

32.1

31.7

43.6

SOELG proportion (%)

20.1

19.2

16.7
9.3 5.3

SOECG propotion (%)

1.4

15.5

SOE proportion (%)

*: Offer Amount = Offering price per share * Total offering shares

54

27.9

Figure 9.The Yearly Quantity and Scale of SOECG’s IPOs in H-share
Market (1994-2011)

Figure 9. Offer Amount* and Number of SOECG
IPOs in H-share Market (1994-2011)
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Figure 10.The Yearly Quantity and Scale of SOELG’s IPOs in Hshare Market (1994-2011)

Figure 10. Offer Amount* and Number of SOELG
IPOs in H-share Market (1994-2011)
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Figure 11-15. The CEOs Yearly Average Pay for Listed Firms
(Figure 11 for Year 2004, Figure 12 for Year 2005, Figure 13 for Year 2006, Figure
14 for Year 2007 and Figure 15 for Year 2008.)
*: IPO Age= Pay Reporting Year – Listing Year

57

58

Table 1.SOEs Cross-Listings in A-share Market and H-share Market
Number of firms

H>A

H=A

H<A*

SOECG

4

9

14

SOELG

3

6

23

SOE

7

15

37

Non-SOE

1

2

7

Total

8

17

44

*H represents for listing year in H-share while A is for listing
year in A-share.
H>A means that listed in mainland before listing in Hong Kong;
H=A means that cross-listing occurred at the same year;
H<A means that listed in mainland after listing in Hong Kong.
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Table 2.CEOs Average Pay in Three Groups
Variables

A-share Market

H-share Market

CEO's Pay

Year

Mean

Std. Dev.

Year

Mean

Std. Dev.

(RMB thousand)

2009

521.74

588.67

2009

837.31

924.05

2008

471.13

595.42

2008

733.48

630.41

2007

437.13

534.85

2007

747.81

743.20

2006

289.02

278.57

2006

601.24

602.40

2005

250.03

243.11

2005

621.40

720.19

2004

137.67

44.23

2004

623.83

700.28

2003

110.22

42.77

2002

92.46

58.00

2001

78.20

66.63

SOECG

445.31

452.87

649.12

581.45

SOELG

382.82

489.34

833.32

1007.59

Ind1

414.22

337.93

522.48

1201.10

Ind2

387.78

440.85

520.79

587.54

Ind3

340.16

406.97

848.88

771.14

Ind4

757.14

969.79

1474.25

277.69

Ind5

338.01

348.66

999.57

1048.69

CEO's Pay base on
ownership structure*
(RMB thousand)
CEO's Pay base on industry
(RMB thousand)

Ownership represents the actual controller of enterprises where SOECG stands for the SOE controlled by
central government and SOELG stands for the SOE controlled by local government.
*The CEO's pay base on ownership structure (mean and standard deviation) is for the whole period.
Ind1-IT & Energy
Ind2-Utilities & Health Care
Ind3-Raw Materials & Industry
Ind4-Financial Industry
Ind5-Daily & Non-Daily Consumption
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Table 3.The Definition of Variables
Variables

Definition
Dummy Variable, if the firm listed in H-share Market, equal to 1,
Hdummy
otherwise, 0.
Dummy Variable, if the CEO is Political Connected, equal to 1, otherwise,
Political
0.
Lnrp
Lnrp = Ln (the firm's registered capital)
Lnoffer
Lnoffer = Ln (the firm's offering price per share * total offering shares)
Csale
Csale = IPO Cost / the firm's annual sales
Dummy Variable, if the firm is controlled by central government, equal to
SOECG
1, otherwise, 0.
Lnsale
Lnsale = Ln (the firm's annual sales)
Lnsize
Lnsize = Ln (the firm's yearly number of employees)
ROA
Return on Asset (Yearly)
ROE
Return on Equity (Yearly)
EPS
Earning per share (Yearly)
Profit
Profit = Net Profit / the firm's annual sales
Age
Age = CEO's Pay Reporting Year - CEO's Birth Year
Age2
Age2 = Age * Age, the square of Age.
Dummy Variable, if the CEO obtained a bachelor degree or above, equal
Degree
to 1, otherwise, 0.
Year
the exact number of CEO's Pay Reporting Year
Ind1
IT & Energy Industry
Ind2
Utilities & Health Care Industry
Ind3
Raw Materials & Industrial Industry
Ind4
Financial Industry
Lnwage
Lnwage = Ln (the CEO's annual pay)
LnH
LnH = Ln (the CEO's predicted annual pay in H-share Market)
LnA
LnA = Ln (the CEO's predicted annual pay in A-share Market)
D
D = LnH - LnA, the CEO's predicted pay differential.
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Table 4.The Empirical Results of Linear Wage Equations

Variables
Hdummy
Political
Lnrp
Lnoffer
Csale
SOECG
Lnsale
Lnsize
ROA
ROE
EPS
Profit
Age
Age2
Degree
Year
Ind1
Ind2
Ind3
Ind4
Constant

(1)
Lnwage

(2)
Lnwage

(3)
Lnwage

(4)
Lnwage

0.552***(0.169)

0.544***(0.143)

0.505***(0.129)

-0.199*(0.107)
0.290***(0.030)
-0.119***(0.032)
-0.0002(0.003)
0.003**(0.001)
0.363***(0.061)
-0.000684(0.001)
-0.042(0.047)
0.0005(0.0005)
0.005(0.090)
0.133***(0.012)
0.125(0.122)
0.167(0.104)
-0.042(0.076)
0.363***(0.136)
-258.3***(23.59)

0.403***(0.141)
0.182**(0.078)
0.054(0.047)
0.009(0.046)
-0.057(0.295)
-0.197*(0.110)
0.265***(0.036)
-0.133***(0.033)
8.38e-05(0.004)
0.003**(0.001)
0.357***(0.061)
-0.000790(0.001)
-0.045(0.047)
0.0005(0.0005)
-0.016(0.090)
0.137***(0.012)
0.138(0.125)
0.177*(0.105)
-0.030(0.077)
0.307**(0.149)
-267.4***(24.41)

2,335
0.313

2,335
0.319

-0.002(0.00429)
0.004***(0.002)
0.542***(0.071)
-0.000877(0.001)
0.00969(0.0524) -0.028(0.048)
0.0001(0.001)
0.0004(0.0005)
0.196*(0.101)
0.125(0.096)
0.176***(0.012) 0.158***(0.012)
0.122(0.132)
0.079(0.127)
0.077(0.121)
0.056(0.113)
0.046(0.088)
0.003(0.082)
0.497***(0.171) 0.413***(0.150)
-342.8***(24.29) -304.1***(23.19)

Observations 2,335
R-squared
0.136

2,335
0.237

Robust standard errors in parentheses：*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5.The Result of Heckman Selection Model in H-share Market
Variables
Political

(1)
Lnwage

(2)
Hdummy
0.981***
(0.205)
-0.336*
(0.192)
0.645***
(0.166)
2.048
(1.373)
0.470**
(0.239)
0.0241
(0.132)
0.0485
(0.0817)
-0.0324**
(0.0137)
0.0127***
(0.00413)
-0.00774
(0.214)
0.000915
(0.00307)
0.310*
(0.163)
-0.00312**
(0.00156)
0.649
(0.413)
0.0365
(0.0370)
1.381***
(0.413)
1.013**
(0.458)
0.912***
(0.352)
-1.155
(0.801)
-91.46
(73.11)

Lnrp
Lnoffer
Csale
SOECG

-0.828**
(0.341)
Lnsale
0.417**
(0.179)
Lnsize
-0.0102
(0.222)
ROA
0.0403
(0.0249)
ROE
-0.00119
(0.0105)
EPS
-0.219**
(0.105)
Profit
-0.00523***
(0.00195)
Age
-0.204
(0.305)
Age2
0.00111
(0.00288)
Degree
1.547***
(0.594)
Year
-0.0531
(0.0660)
Ind1
-0.456
(0.648)
Ind2
-0.352
(0.762)
Ind3
-0.961
(0.722)
Ind4
-0.212
(0.738)
Constant
117.8
(132.3)
Athrho
-0.308(0.225)
Lnsigma
-0.187*(0.199)
Observations
124
124
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

63

Table 6.The Result of Heckman Selection Model in A-share Market
Variables
Political

(1)
Lnwage

(2)
Adummy
-0.984***
(0.212)
0.326*
(0.194)
-0.652***
(0.168)
-2.023
(1.368)
-0.463*
(0.238)
-0.0174
(0.132)
-0.0436
(0.0815)
0.0319**
(0.0138)
-0.0123***
(0.00421)
0.00364
(0.215)
-0.000757
(0.00316)
-0.309*
(0.162)
0.00311**
(0.00156)
-0.644
(0.413)
-0.0358
(0.0370)
-1.356***
(0.417)
-0.996**
(0.459)
-0.893**
(0.352)
1.165
(0.809)
90.07
(73.04)

Lnrp
Lnoffer
Csale
SOECG

-0.168
(0.114)
Lnsale
0.289***
(0.0310)
Lnsize
-0.121***
(0.0323)
ROA
-0.00147
(0.00358)
ROE
0.00265**
(0.00120)
EPS
0.388***
(0.0624)
Profit
-0.000643
(0.000743)
Age
-0.0505
(0.0462)
Age2
0.000590
(0.000448)
Degree
0.000863
(0.0904)
Year
0.141***
(0.0115)
Ind1
0.118
(0.127)
Ind2
0.176*
(0.106)
Ind3
-0.0429
(0.0768)
Ind4
0.349**
(0.137)
Constant
-274.2***
(22.89)
Athrho
0.0658(0.143)
Lnsigma
-0.171***(0.0275)
Observations
2,211
2,211
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7.The CEO’s Predicted Wage in H-share Market and A-share
Market
Variable
Lnwage
LnH
LnA
D

Obs
2335
2335
2335
2335

Mean
12.42332
13.43476
12.39313
1.041621

Std.Dev.
1.030578
1.118449
0.5688072
1.125575
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Min
9.392662
9.615799
10.39169
-2.62776

Max
15.79477
17.07791
15.33087
4.90614

Table 8.The Result of Probit Test
Equation

Variables

(1)
Hdummy

Hdummy

D
Political
Lnrp
Lnoffer
SOECG
Lnsale
ROA
ROE
EPS
Profit
Age
Age2
Year
Ind1
Ind2
Ind3
Ind4
Constant

0.531*(0.298)
1.007***(0.207)
-0.249(0.186)
0.687***(0.170)
0.824***(0.316)
-0.199*(0.121)
-0.0612***(0.0199)
0.0147***(0.00418)
0.332(0.301)
0.00718***(0.00257)
0.409**(0.178)
-0.00353**(0.00160)
0.145**(0.0614)
1.725***(0.457)
1.311***(0.500)
1.388***(0.447)
-0.964(0.838)
-310.2**(123.9)

Observations

2,335

Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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